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A game theoretical analysis of FTA network
formation
Kazuki Hirase
Abstract
We would like to analyze a free trade agreement (FTA)network formation  or collapse processes and thestable network.
For  the purpose, we consider a 3-stage game. Each country has a government, a firm, and a market. At first,every government decides to make FTA each other.
 Second,  every government decides the tariff rate each other(The rate is zero if
 the governments made FTA.).   Third, each firm faces Cournot oligopoly on  every marketand decides the amount of the
eχport and domestic products.
For simplicity, we investigate the case n＝3.  As a result, one FTA and three FTA (the complete network)are the stable networks.
Keywords: FTA, Network Formation, Cournot competition
JEL classification: C70; FIO; D21
1　Introduction
We consider an FTA formation model which is described as a 3-stage game. Each country has a
government,  a firm, and a market. At first, every government decides to make FTA each other. Second,every government decides the tariff
 rate each other. If the firms are connected by an FTA, they canmake free trade. Otherwise,
 they are induced the strategic tariff Third, given the governments' tradepolicies,
 each firm faces Cournot oligopoly in every market and decides the amount of the e χport anddomestic products
。
We assume that  each firm ma χimizes the profit and that each government maximizes the totalamount of the firm's profit,
 consumers' surplus, and the tariff revenue of the country. We can clarify
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the formation (or collapse)process of the FTA network by using backward induction  and the definitionof stable network by Jackson and Wolinsky
 (1996),
In the literature けhe formation of a network is studied by Jackson and Wolinsky  (1996), Dutta andMutuswami
 (1997), Watts  (2001), Jackson and  Watts  (2002)and so on. They analyze the endogenousnetwork formation
けhe stable network, and the  reasonable allocation in general settings. Goyal andJoshi
 (2003)apply the model to oligopoly  cases.　Kawamata and Tamada (2004)and Hirase (2012)especially pay attention to Cournot competition.
   Bilateral FTA is introduced by Goyal and Joshi(2006).FTA network formation in the differentiated industrial commodities case is studied by Furusawaand Konishi (2007).ln our model, we focus
the formation or collapse process of the FTA network of
the homogenous  good using partial equilibrium analysis. We discuss also the incentives  of the outsiderof
 the FTA.
The rest of the paper is composed as follows. The general terms and notations are defined in Section
2. The e χample of the three country case is shown in Section 3. Section 4 is the concluding remarks.
2　The Model
2.1　Market
Let  A^ ＝{1,2, …,n} be a set of countries. Each country has one government, one firm and onemarket.
   Each firm produces a homogeneous good for the domestic market and the e χports. In eachmarket J
， the firms faces a linear inverse demand function as follows:
Pj ＝a 一 Qj，a  ＞＞0, 巾
where  巧is the price and Q, ・ is the amount of the demand. And they play a Cournot competition.
The marginal cost of each firm i is given by c.　For convenience, we also assume a ＞c ＞O anddenote the amount
of firm i's product for market j as lij・
Before the competition, each government of the country decides to make FTA or not, and then
induces the strategic tariff on the firm which is not linked to that country. We denote the tari 汀rate ofgovernment
 i to firm j as 岫,  which implies that  赳i ＝0 if the country k  and j  makes FTA. We  assume
臨=  0 for any  country i G  N.    Thus, we can consider a 3-stage game. At 1st stage, FTA networkforms.
 At 2nd stage, each government given a network decides the tariff levels. At 3rd stage, each firmdecides the amount of the products.
Given the tariff levels and the amounts of the products firm i's profit from market  j.   mj is as
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follows.
町 ＝拓鮒 －cqu  - tjiqij =  (a－Qj  －c 一帖)肪 ＝(a －Σ<lkj  －C 一帖)鮒( ∀hj ∈N).      (2)
The profit of firm ≪, TTi is defined as TTi ニ ΣjeN てij・The consumers surplus  at market i is definedas usual:
CSi: ＝i 妬　 （∀i e N ）.　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　 （3 ）
Government i's tariff revenue is
Ti: ＝ ΣtijqjijeN (∀ieN) (4)
where  tkj =  0 if country  k and j make FTA and 臨 ＝0.The welfare of  country  i is defined as follows
凧 ＝CSi  ＋iTi十乃　 （∀i£N) (5)
By backward induction, each government decides the tariff  level to maximize the  country's welfare.For convenience, we assume that government i induces
no tariff to FTA  countries and a constant tarifflevel
 れto the other countries. That is, tij  ＝ ちん=  ねif country i have not made FTA with  country  jand
country k,  and  稲 ＝0 if country i and  country Z have made FTA.
2.2　FTA Network
The terms on network are same as Hirase (2012).A network g on N is a set of pairs of the members
of TV, c ⊂{{ 乱 丿抑J  G  N,i ≠j}.  An element of 9 is called a link. 往j}  is the link between i and jwhich means a FTA between i and J.
We focus on the case three countries in the ne χt section.   The network patterns of the case issummarized Figure 1.
2.3　stability
In the game, each pair of the countries decides to form or sever a link and coalition structure
is formed at first stage. And then, the firms play the Cournot competition  as second stage. In thissubsection, we define the stability of the network.
For convenience,  let ■Ki(g)be the profit of firm i for a given network 9. The firms have the oppor-tunity
 to form new links  or sever  existing links for a network g. According to Jackson and Wolinsky(1996),
 we define the pairwise stable network as follows:
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No FTA
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Figure 1: networks (n  ＝3)
り
3
(IV)
FTA Network
Definition 1. A network g is pairwise stable if two conditions below are satisfied.
1. ∀{hj}G 9, 几(g) ＞ バ9 ＼{り})and り(d) ＞ 乃( 八{hj}) ・
2. ∀{hj バ £?, if 7r面} 〈7i"心U{i,j}) ，then 7り(ジ)＞7r,(ffU{ り}) ・
2.4　Equilibrium
Prom a given network 9, we can derive the best response function of firm i by first order condition
a ‾c ‾Σ2 ちi　　
（∀i,j,k∈N) 囲
At an equilibrium, each equation above is satisfied. Hence,  from the assumption, the production amountat an equilibrium is as follows (
＊means  the equilibrium).
昿 ニa  ‾c:と宍jT1）妬 （∀沁N ）and　 鴫 ニ a- ∇12ち
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The tariff levels at the equilibrium satisfy all equations (first order conditions) bellow
dCSi
∂ち
-
- 0, 一一 0, and
∂乃
一
∂ち
＝O　 （∀衣e N ）.
We investigate the solutions  of the three country case and interpret it in the ne χt section
㈲
3　E χample
Suppose that n ＝3. Without loss of generality, we can obtain four FTA situations  shown in Figure1(1. n, Ill,
 and IV).  The solutions of the four situations are described in the four subsections below.
3
3
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3rd stage
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3.2.1　3rd stage
3.2.2　2nd stage
凪 ＝'^^ ＝0A2(a－c)　( ∀汪N)
＝??
＝????
522
-
-
523  =
931　 ＝　932   =
033　 ＝
赳　 ＝
512  =  (721 ＝a
 ― c － 2i3
a
4
ご
4
α 一c  ＋2i3
£2
乱　 ＝　 赳 ＝
is --
2
(a －c)7
(a －c)3
3れ
and
Qii　 ニ　Ql2  =q2 ＼  =922  =
＝??
＝????
( α －c)-
932  ＝
α 一C ＋ 赳
4
2( α －c)-
桓うし
ロ
，and
(5a  －c)933　
＝　 匹
290
(9)
3.2.3　Welfare
Hence,
皿 ＝W2  ＝
3145(a一回
7056
3.3　Two FTAs (m)
3.3.1　3rd stage
3.3.2　2nd stage
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3.3.3　Welfare
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3.4　Complete FTA network (IV)
3.4.1　3rd stage
a-  c ∀i,jeN) ・3.4.2
2nd stage
Each tariff level iszero because of the Complete FTA network.
3.4.3　Welfare
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i^(“ ‾):^0.469(a －c)^　( ∀衣ΞN)32
4　Concluding Remarks
The result of the example in Section 3 is summarized in Figure. 2
(I)
No FTA
10.42
●
(II)
One FTA
2 0.42
land 3 is
All countries are　　　　lbetter oflf.
¬ ソ 0.446
／0.446
are better off
Complete 阻
●
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0.418　1　
彩
で^M
宍でId　　　　　　　　　　　　　1　0.469
匹
匹
∴
溥 匹tte?^^
2
0.498
3
0.418
2
0.469
Figure 2: network formation
3
0.469
(12)
・From the definition, both one FTA (I)and the complete FTA network (IV)are  stable networks.
●(I)-(II):lf no FTA e χists, any single FTA is supported by all  countries  (including the outsider).This
 means  that the FTA between country l and 2 is supported by not only theiTiselves but alsocountry 3 which is outside of the free trade.
・(II)-(III):Thecountry which has made one FTA has an incentive to make the FTA with  countrywhich has made no
FTA. 0n the other hand, the country which has made no FTA does not have
incentive to make FTA with the country which has made one FTA. Prom the definition of the
stability, FTA between l and 3 is not made.
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・(III)-(IV):At  (III), both  country l and  country 3 have incentive to make FTA. However, country2 would like to remain the hub (center)position of the trades. It has an incentive to interferethe FTA foi-mation between country l
and 3. This outsider's motivation has implications for the
multi-country FTA formations or negotiations.
●Any  country would like to be the hub or center position of the trade (have many structural holes).However, the star or line network (two FTAs (Ill))can not be stable.
●Future problem: It is to generalize the investigation  and the model. We can investigate n countrycase.
 We can weaken one homogenous (good and  country)settings and the assumptions on. thedemand function. And we would like to use the general equilibrium analysis.
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